| | | | | | | | January 2026 Welcome to the January 2026 edition of Disability Law News. In this issue, we lead with an update regarding the Social Security Administration’s decision to withdraw its sweeping “MegaReg” proposal to overhaul the vocational rules. We also cover troubling new details about the misuse of SSA systems and the agency’s ongoing expansion of its data-sharing. Readers will find updates on the 2026 ABLE contribution limit and the expansion of eligibility to age 46; a report on SSA’s ongoing reorganization, recent USPS postmarking changes that may affect filing deadlines, and a federal push to end states’ diversion of foster youths’ Social Security benefits. Other articles cover emerging issues in TPD student loan discharges. This issue also includes a Second Circuit decision clarifying RFC requirements, a spotlight on OIG’s findings regarding telephone metrics, and our bulletin board of resources. | | | |  | | | As we reported in our October newsletter, the Social Security Administration (SSA) included in its Spring 2025 Regulatory Agenda a proposal to dramatically change the rules it uses to determine whether a person can work in its disability determinations. After what The Washington Post described an “uproar” from advocates and others concerned about its impact on claimants, SSA has since abandoned its plan. Advocates applauded the decision. Experts had warned that the proposal would fundamentally alter how disability is evaluated, particular for older workers. The proposed regulatory rule change, referred to by some as the “Mega-Reg,” was never released by SSA, but The Washington Post and others had reported that the proposal was carried over from the first Trump Administration, and would have made it more difficult to qualify for disability benefits. It was reported that the proposal would have eliminated age as a criterion in disability determination process. The consideration of age is rooted in the statutory requirements, and its elimination would be a radical departure from the current framework for disability determinations. 42 U.S.C. § 223(d)(2)(A). | | | The proposal would also have rescinded the “Grid rules.” Formally known as the Medical-Vocational Guidelines—the Grid rules help adjudicators determine disability by combining a claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity to assess whether they can adjust to other work. 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. The Grids were originally adopted to bring uniformity to disability determinations by applying the same structured criteria. POMS DI 25025.005. Advocates and experts warned that the Mega-Reg would disproportionately harm older workers, especially those in regions with limited employment opportunities. ProPublica highlighted claimants likely to be impacted by the change, including 50- to 60-year-olds without a high school education who have a history of physical, demanding work such as construction, logging, and coal mining. A report by the Urban Institute, estimated the proposed changes would have decreased the number of eligible older adults by 30%. Just a 10% reduction would result in 500,000 fewer eligible individuals overall. | | | | | | | |  | | | Concerns over Social Security Administration (SSA) data-sharing practices intensified as new details emerged regarding the handling of SSA systems by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and as SSA issues a series of modified Systems of Records Notices (SORNs). The events highlight several significant risks posed by expanded inter-agency access to sensitive SSA data, including the risk of improper voter purges. In a court filing dated January 16, 2026, SSA revealed that it had previously misstated the extent of DOGE access to sensitive SSA data. The filing disclosed that DOGE staff had signed a “voter data agreement” with an advocacy group focused on overturning election results in select states, potentially enabling the use of SSA data to match against voter rolls for political purposes. DOGE personnel also used an unapproved third-party Cloudflare server to store or transmit SSA data, and SSA continues to be unable to verify what information was shared or whether it remains accessible. | | | A DOGE staffer also transmitted an encrypted file the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) believed to contain the names and addresses of approximately 1,000 individuals drawn from SSA systems. Based on the coordination with an advocacy group to analyze state voter rolls using SSA data, SSA made two Hatch Act referrals to the Office of Special Counsel. The corrections to the record were made in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Social Security Administration, No. 1:25-cv-00596-ELH, a case alleging that SSA violated federal privacy laws in unlawfully granting DOGE personnel access to SSA systems. More details about the lawsuit are in our April 2025 newsletter. | | | | | | | | | | The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has announced an increase in the annual contribution limit for Achieving a Better Life Experience (ABLE) accounts for the 2026 tax year. The new aggregate contribution limit is set at $20,000 compared to the previous year’s limit of $19,000. This adjustment reflects inflation-indexed increases tied to the federal gift tax exclusion. In addition to this standard rate adjustment, there is also a major expansion in ABLE eligibility that took effect on January 1, 2026. ABLE accounts allow eligible individuals with disabilities to save for qualified disability-related expenses without jeopardizing eligibility for federal means-tested benefits. The dollar limit represents the total amount that may be contributed to an ABLE account during the tax year from all sources combined, including contributions made by the beneficiary, family members, and others. Advocates should note a significant expansion in age eligibility that just took effect under the ABLE Age Adjustment Act, which expands eligibility for ABLE accounts to individuals whose disability began before age 46, a substantial increase from the longstanding cutoff of age 26. | | | This expansion will open ABLE accounts to millions of people who previously did not qualify, including those whose disabilities arose later in life due to chronic illness, injury, or military service. The ABLE Age Adjustment Act passed in 2022 but was not scheduled to take effect until January 1, 2026. The change is widely regarded as the most significant improvement to the ABLE Act since its passage in 2014, dramatically widening access to tax-advantaged savings and greater financial autonomy for a substantially larger eligible population. More about the 2022 passage can be found in our January 2023 newsletter. Together, the new contribution limit and expanded age-of-onset rule will allow far more individuals to benefit from the protections and flexibility that ABLE accounts offer. | | | | | | | | The Social Security Administration (SSA) continues to implement nationwide structural changes that affect both the Office of Hearings Operations (OHO), now known as Hearings, and state-based Disability Determination Services (DDS). In a November 2025 “Dear Colleagues” letter, SSA announced a Hearing “Hub” structure to replace the previous regional organization of the OHOs. Unlike the prior model, the Hubs are not geographically grouped. For example, hearing offices in New York state could be Hub A (New York and Varick hearing offices) or Hub B (all other hearing offices in the state). The Dear Colleague letter directs representatives to address general inquiries related to Hearings to a designated mailbox for each Hub, DA.HRNGHubA.Rep.Mail@ssa.gov and DA.HRNGHubB.Rep.Mail@ssa.gov, respectively. | | | Related to the DDSs, Acting Chief Administrative Law Judge Jay Ortis (previously the Acting Deputy Commissioner) has reported that there is also a restructuring initiative, which assigns three Portfolio Executive Leads (PELs) to oversee the DDSs, aiming to address critical performance challenges. These offices have recently experienced significant, measurable decreases in productivity and high rates of staff attrition. The 3 PELs will focus on reversing these trends. Advocates are anxious to see how this restructuring plays out and if it will be a benefit to their clients. | | | | | |  | | | Representatives who rely on mailing filings, appeals, or other time-sensitive documents should be aware of significant changes in how the United States Postal Service (USPS) handles postmarking. Beginning December 24, 2025, the USPS implemented new procedures for dating mail. 90 Fed. Reg. 52883 (Nov. 24, 2025). The postmarking of letters and packages will occur when the items are processed at the postal facility rather than when they are dropped off in a mailbox. As a result, mail may arrive with markings that do not clearly reflect the date the item was mailed. Processing can occur hours or days after deposit. An analysis by the Brookings Institute discussed how this timing gap can clearly create problems when documents will be deemed untimely if not “postmarked” by a certain date. Representatives should consider adjusting mailing practices to account for these changes: | | | -
Maintain internal documentation, including copies of envelopes, receipts, and tracking confirmations, in the event timeliness is challenged. Bottom line is, USPS postmarking practices have changed, but filing deadlines have not. Until consistent postmarking returns—if it does—advocates should assume that an accurate or visible postmark may not be applied and plan accordingly. | | | | | | | | The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) — through its Administration for Children and Families (ACF) — has formally notified 39 state governors that their child welfare agencies are improperly diverting earned Social Security survivor benefits intended for children in foster care. The letters, sent in December 2025, assert that many state child welfare agencies are intercepting Social Security survivor benefits (which are earned by a child through a deceased parent’s work history) and using them to reimburse state foster care costs — rather than ensuring those funds are available to the youth themselves. ACF emphasizes that these are federal benefits earned by the child, not state revenue and that practice undermines the financial security of foster youth, especially as they prepare to transition out of care. HHS and the Social Security Administration have signaled they will offer technical assistance and resources to help states revise policies and preserve these benefits for eligible youth. | | | Eleven states have already adopted policies to protect these benefits for foster youths’ current needs and future use. Meanwhile, child welfare advocates continue to work with state legislators and agencies in other states to remove policy provisions that allow benefit diversion. Advocates also highlight that this federal effort aligns with long-standing legislative concerns about states seizing Social Security benefits intended for foster children. While beyond the scope of most DAP advocates, it is important to be on notice if state policies divert benefits that belong to clients. New York City suspended this practice in 2022 and in April 2025; a bill was also introduced in New York State (A08036/S07778), to protect benefits of children in foster care. | | | | | | | | | | The Social Security Administration recently informed advocates and third-party representatives of a new email address for correspondence: External_Relations@ssa.gov This email replaces the previous address, oea.net.post@ssa.gov. This is not a new mailbox – just a new address for sending inquiries and updates. Advocates should update their records and use the new address for all future communications with SSA regarding policy, outreach, or third-party matters. | | | | | | Arjun Mody Sworn In as Deputy Commissioner of Social Security | | On January 5, 2026, Arjun Mody was sworn in as the Deputy Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA), where he will serve as the agency’s Chief Operating Officer for a term running through January 19, 2031. Mody’s appointment follows confirmation by the United States Senate on December 18, 2025. Arjun Mody succeeds David Fabian Black, who held the position of Deputy Commissioner of Social Security prior to the expiration of his term. Before joining SSA, Mody served in senior leadership positions across the federal government. His public-sector career includes service as a Sherpa program official for the Trump–Vance transition — where he helped coordinate presidential nominations — | | | and leadership roles in the U.S. Senate, including as Staff Director of the Senate Republican Conference. He also worked in legislative and public affairs positions for several U.S. Senators. He holds degrees from La Salle University, the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, and American University’s Washington College of Law. In his new role, Mody will oversee the administration of SSA’s core programs and operations, including policy development and financial management systems for an agency that delivers retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to tens of millions of Americans. | | | | | |  | | | While the Department of Education has recently overhauled its Total and Permanent Disability (TPD) discharge system with the stated goal of improving access, advocates nationwide are reporting serious implementation problems that are creating new barriers for borrowers with disabilities. Since its inception, the Higher Education Act of 1965 has offered debt relief for disabled borrowers with federal student debt. There have been decades of policy and program reforms in an effort to expand eligibility and ease administrative burdens. In sum, TPD provides that borrowers who are totally and permanently disabled may have their federal student loans discharged. The current issues arising from the program began with a 2024 transition. In April 2024, Federal Student Aid (FSA) moved the processing of specialty student loan programs—including TPD—from external student loan servicers to FSA. Nelnet would stop processing TPD applications, and borrowers would instead submit TPD applications directly through StudentAid.gov, which other contractors would manage on the back end under FSA’s supervision. Reportedly, the transition was completed in March 2025. | | | Of particular interest to disability advocates, since September 2021, recipients of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) should automatically be eligible for TPD student loan discharge, without an application, but recent reports show many recipients are still waiting for relief. In theory, quarterly, the Department of Education uses data from the Social Security Administration to identify borrowers receiving SSDI or SSI who meet TPD eligibility criteria. These borrowers should no longer need to submit a formal application - their loans are supposed to be discharged automatically. However, despite the automatic process, advocates report significant delays in approvals. Many borrowers see no updates in their accounts or official notifications even after being flagged as eligible through SSA records. Ongoing system transitions and processing backlogs are slowing relief, leaving some SSD/SSI recipients in limbo. | | | | | | | | Court Decisions _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ | | Second Circuit Clarifies RFC Requirements | | In Nunez v. Commissioner of Social Security (2d Cir., 2025), (decided November 25, 2025, but amended on December 29, 2025) the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the proper formulation of a claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) when assessing Social Security disability claims. Giovanni Nunez applied for disability benefits due to chronic panic disorder that affected his ability to concentrate and attend work regularly. The Social Security Administration (SSA) initially denied his claim, and the administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed this decision. However, the Second Circuit found that the ALJ’s RFC determination lacked substantial evidentiary support. The record included testimony from the plaintiff, a vocational expert, and five medical professionals, all of whom opined that he had at least moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, staying on task, and regular work attendance. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform unskilled work in a goal-oriented setting, without finding any specific limitations on his ability to stay on task or maintain regular attendance. The vocational expert testified that an individual who was off-task more than 10% of the workday or absent more than one day per month would be unable to maintain employment. | | | In the decision, the Second Circuit finds that the ALJ failed to account for the unanimous opinions regarding Nunez’s limitations for staying on task and his need for predictable attendance, despite clear testimony from a vocational expert on how these restrictions affect employability. The court emphasized that expert testimony about essential work requirements must be considered when formulating RFC. The case was remanded to SSA for further proceedings with instructions to clarify and properly support the RFC finding. For DAP advocates, Nunez is a reminder of the importance of thorough documentation and linking medical evidence to functional limitations in disability claims. | | | | | | | | Administrative Decisions _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ | | Recent Wins Ensure Critical Needs are Met | | The Disability Advocacy Program (DAP) at Manhattan Legal Services (MLS) continues to secure critical victories for clients whose health, income, and housing depend on stable access to their disability benefits. One case involved a client who was violently attacked in 2021 and developed PTSD, severe anxiety, and agoraphobia as a result. The client subsequently fell behind on his rent payments and faced eviction due to his inability to work and leave his apartment without medication and support. While the housing unit at MLS addressed the unsafe apartment conditions and prevented the client’s displacement, Lynette Morrow, a DAP attorney, represented him in his Title II claim. The judge found that he met the listing for PTSD and awarded the client approximately $52,000 in retroactive benefits and $1,555 per month. This allowed the client to pay his arrears, stabilize his housing, and qualify for a rent freeze, which in turn allowed him to preserve both his home and his financial security. | | | A second victory involved a 46‑year‑old individual with limited English proficiency and longstanding impairments from cerebrovascular disease. SSA terminated the client’s SSI benefits following a Continuing Disability Review conducted without a proper interpreter, relying instead on the client’s husband, who also has limited English skills. Benefits were cut off due to alleged noncompliance. DAP Attorney Tariq Khan represented the client at the hearing level, overcoming limited treatment records and a flawed psychological consultative exam by demonstrating significant neurological deficits, strong client testimony, evidence of home health aide support, and medical opinions. The ALJ issued a fully favorable decision, restoring the client’s SSI benefits under Listing 11.04(B). Thank you to the MLS DAP team for sharing these success stories. | | | | | | | | | | Send Us Your Decisions! Have you had a recent ALJ or court decision or SSA update that you would like to see reported in an upcoming issue of the Disability Law News? We would love to hear from you! Contact Katherine Courtney, kcourtney@empirejustice.org or Emilia Sicilia, esicilia@empirejustice.org | | | | | | | | Studies & Reports _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ | | | | | | The Social Security Administration’s (SSA) telephone service performance remains under scrutiny following the release of a December 2025 audit by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The report, Social Security Administration’s Telephone Metrics, 032517, was initiated at the request of Senator Elizabeth Warren in response to concerns about whether SSA’s publicly reported wait time metrics accurately reflected the real experience of callers seeking assistance through the national 800 number. Although the OIG concluded that SSA’s publicly reported telephone metrics were technically accurate, the audit and subsequent reporting note gaps between the numbers SSA publishes and the experience of millions who navigate the agency’s customer service infrastructure. | | | SSA changed the telephone metrics it publishes, and in fiscal year FY 2025 focused on improved Average Speed of Answer (ASA) as a performance goal. In FY 2025, SSA reported that ASA fell to 7 minutes, down from 29.7 minutes in January 2025—a change the agency cast as a major service improvement. But according to the OIG audit, ASA does not take into account several important outcomes, including: | | | | | | | | | _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ | | This "Bulletin Board" contains information about recent disability decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit summaries, as well as earlier decisions, are also available here. Synopses of non-precedential summary orders issued by the Second Circuit are available here. We will continue to write more detailed articles about significant decisions as they are issued by these and other Courts, but we hope that these lists will help advocates gain an overview of the body of recent judicial decisions that are important in our judicial circuit. | | | | U.S. v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539 (April 22, 2022) In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of residents of Puerto Rico from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program does not violate the United States Constitution. The Court applied the rational basis test to find it permissible to treat residents of territories such as Puerto Rico differently than if they lived in a state because of the different tax status applicable to territories, an outcome authorized by the Territories Clause of the Constitution. The Court declined to rebuke the Insular Cases, a line of case law that sanctioned the colonial relationship of the U.S. to the territories, and that determined the full scope of the Constitution did not apply. A lone dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor described the majority decision as “especially cruel given those citizens’ dire need for aid.” Carr v. Saul, 141 S.Ct. 1352 (Apr. 22, 2021) The Supreme Court held that a claimant is not precluded from raising a legal issue for the first time in U.S. District Court if it was not raised before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The underlying issue in question in Carr and its companion cases was whether the ALJ was properly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In the aftermath of Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 138 S.Ct. 2044 (2018) challenging the constitutionality of SEC ALJs, Carr and other plaintiffs challenged the legitimacy of the ALJs who had denied their disability claims and sought new hearings. The Commissioner argued the plaintiffs had forfeited their Appointments Clause challenges because they had not raised them before SSA during the administrative appeals process. The Supreme Court resolved a conflict in the circuits by holding that given the non-adversarial nature of SSA hearings, issue-exhaustion is not required. Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1765 (2019) The Supreme Court held that an Appeals Council dismissal of a request for review is a final decision subject to judicial review. The Court unanimously held that where the Appeals Council has dismissed a request for review as untimely after a claimant has obtained a hearing from an ALJ on the merits, the dismissal qualifies as a “final decision . . . made after a hearing” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C § 405(g). It distinguished its earlier ruling in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977), by emphasizing that as opposed to the denial of a request for reopening in Sanders, there had been a decision by an ALJ on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148 (2019) In a 6-3 decision, the Court declined to adopt a categorical rule that a vocational expert’s supporting data must be provided in order for the testimony to constitute substantial evidence. But the majority acknowledged that in some cases it may be possible to draw an adverse inference against a VE who refuses to provide supporting data. | | | | Flinton v. Commissioner of Social Security, 143 F.4th 90 (2d Cir. July 2, 2025) The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for a new hearing before a different, properly appointed ALJ. The court held that the plaintiff, whose 2018 hearing was conducted by an ALJ not constitutionally appointed under the Appointments Clause, had not received the remedy required by Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 217 (2018). The Commissioner’s later ratification of that ALJ’s appointment did not cure the defect, as Lucia mandates reassignment to a different ALJ to preserve structural constitutional protections. The court emphasized that such reassignment is not a mere formality but a necessary remedy when a hearing is tainted by an unconstitutional appointment. The decision—referred to as the “Flinton Rule”—requires new hearings before different ALJs in similar cases involving pre-July 2018 appointments. Rubin v. Martin O’Malley, 116 F.4th 145 (2d. Cir. 2024) The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the C criteria of Mental Impairment Listing 12.04, finding that the ALJ had failed to provide any rational for why the plaintiff did not meet the criteria. The court also offered what could be helpful language on the limited value of Mental Status Exams (MSEs) that can often derail claims. And it acknowledged that a psychiatrist’s opinion can be based on and supported by the totality of the medical evidence from the whole treatment team, not merely his own limited notes. It rejected, however, the plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in denying the claim without the support of a medical opinion that she could work. But because the ALJ had found the psychiatrist’s opinion and those of the non-examining consultants only partially persuasive and because the claimant had failed to attend a consultative examination, the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court remanded for a consultative examination and fuller consideration of the evidence of record. Rucker v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 86, 2022 WL 4074410 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) The court remanded under the pre 2017 opinion evidence regulations that applied to this case, finding the ALJ had not identified substantial evidence to support her conclusion that the plaintiff could work alone except for normal supervision. She also failed to provide good reasons for rejecting the limitations identified by the treating psychiatrist, erroneously rejecting it because it was based on the plaintiff’s own reports. Nor was the plaintiff’s periodic lack of complaints of symptoms sufficient given her lack of insight. The ALJ should not have relied on the plaintiff’s ability to attend therapy as an indication of ability to work. Nor did some positive progress notes and mental status exams justify rejecting the treating source. The ALJ also relied too heavily on a consultative exam. Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2022) The court affirmed the District Court decision under the pre 2017 opinion evidence regulations that applied in this case. It found the ALJ properly accorded lesser weight to the opinions of two treating physicians because one was conclusory and vague and the other, rendered in check-box format, was not supported by the medical evidence. And according to the court, both opinions as to the plaintiff’s tremors and sensory deficits were inconsistent with the medical evidence, which identified only mild tremors, and the plaintiff’s testimony. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s assessment that the opinion of the consultative examiner was entitled to even less weight. It rejected plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ could not make an RFC finding because she had declined to accord controlling weight to any of the medical opinions; the ALJ is entitled to weigh all available evidence to make RFC findings and her conclusion need not perfectly correspond with opinions of record. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s failure to articulate the so-called Burgess factors for evaluating treating source opinions to be harmless error as it was evident she had applied the substance of the treating physician rule. Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845 (2d Cir. Jan. 28, 2022) The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in reducing attorney fees requested by plaintiff’s attorney, Binder & Binder, under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), as a windfall. The Second Circuit, relying on its decision in Wells v. Sullivan (“Wells II”), 907 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1990), and the Supreme Court in Gisbreath v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002), held that to reduce a contingency fee solely on the grounds that the amount requested is a windfall, the court must be clear the fee was not earned by counsel. Here, the appeals court found that the plaintiff’s very experienced attorney represented him professionally, efficiently, and ultimately successfully in four ALJ hearings, several Appeals Council petitions, and two district court appeals. His request for a fee of $40,170, which was 25% of the plaintiff’s retroactive award, was not a windfall even though it constituted an hourly rate of $1,556.98 based on the 25.8 hours expended on representation in the federal court phases of the claims. Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) The court remanded, finding the ALJ erred in failing to accord controlling weight to the opinion of the treating physician under the pre 2017 opinion evidence regulations that applied in this case. The court held the ALJ failed to find good reasons under the old regulations for discounting the opinion of a concussion specialist that the plaintiff would be off task 33% of the day and absent more than four days per month due to her headaches and other impairments. The ALJ also erred in discounting the opinion because it was presented in “check box” form; the opinion was supported by voluminous treatment notes. The court criticized the ALJ for “cherry-picking” particular instances of improvement to create inconsistencies with the treating source opinion. And it criticized the ALJ for relying too heavily on the opinions of consulting physicians, particularly where the consulting opinions did not address or dispute the crux of the treating source’s opinion. Alexander v. Saul, 5 F.4th 139 (2d Cir. July 8, 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1461 (Apr. 4, 2022) The Second Circuit upheld a district court’s refusal to extend the time to appeal its decision affirming the Commissioner’s denial of an SSI claim. Although the Circuit was “sympathetic” to the plaintiff, it concluded the district court had not abused its discretion – even though the plaintiff filed her appeal and request for an extension only two days after the 60-day deadline expired. The district court had reasonably applied the “excusable neglect” factors rather “good cause” standard under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) because the plaintiff’s failure to appeal was at least partially due to her own inadvertence in failing to notify her attorney of her change of address rather than due to her alleged mental illness. The court refused to toll the Rule 4(a)(5) deadline as it is considered jurisdictional and less flexible than the statute of limitations governing the 60-day limit to seek judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. Jan. 7, 2020) The court held that ability to complete work during the probationary period is relevant to a disability claim. It remanded for further proceedings at Step five of the Sequential Evaluation to determine whether the claimant could perform work as required during the probationary period, including meeting the levels for absenteeism tolerated by the employer. Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2019) The Second Circuit remanded, finding the ALJ committed procedural error in failing to “explicitly” apply the factors laid out in Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008), for evaluating treating source opinions. The court reiterated its mandate, rooted both in regulation and precedent, for ALJs to follow specific procedures and adequately explain their reasoning when assigning weight to opinions, citing Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 419-20 (2d Cir. 2013), Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2004)(per curiam). It found the ALJ “cherry picked” the evidence, particularly mental status exam results, without attempting to reconcile longitudinal inconsistencies in this mental health claim. And it criticized the ALJ for relying too heavily on the opinion of the consultative examiner, citing Selian. Lockwood v. Comm’r of SSA, 914 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2019) The Court of Appeals remanded because the ALJ had not met his affirmative obligation under SSR 00-4p to inquire about any possible or apparent conflicts between vocational testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The court found the ALJ did not met his burden simply by asking the vocational expert if her testimony was consistent, especially where the ALJ found the plaintiff could not reach overhead, but the three jobs to which the VE testified all required frequent or occasional reaching. Lesterhuis v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015) The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of a retrospective medical opinion from a treating physician submitted to the Appeals Council, citing Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 1996). The ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the new and material medical opinion from the treating physician that the plaintiff would likely miss four days of work per month. Since the vocational expert had testified a claimant who would be absent that frequently would be unable to work, the physician’s opinion, if credited, would suffice to support a determination of disability. The court also faulted the district court for identifying gaps in the treating physician’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition. Citing Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008), the court reiterated it may not “affirm an administrative action on grounds different from those considered by the agency.” Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370 (2d Cir 2015) The court remanded for clarification of the treating source’s opinion, particularly as to the claimant’s ability to perform postural activities. The doctor had also opined that Mr. Greek would likely be absent from work more than four days a month as a result of his impairments. Since a vocational expert testified there were no jobs Mr. Greek could perform if he had to miss four or more days of work a month, the court found the ALJ’s error misapplication of the factors in the treating physician regulations was not harmless. "After all, SSA's regulations provide a very specific process for evaluating a treating physician's opinion and instruct ALJs to give such opinions 'controlling weight' in all but a limited range of circumstances. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128." (Emphasis supplied.) McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2014) The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the ALJ’s failure to incorporate all of the plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations explicitly into the residual functional capacity (RCF) formulation or the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert (VE) was harmless error. The court ruled that “an ALJ's hypothetical should explicitly incorporate any limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.” 758 F.3d at 152. But in this case, the evidence demonstrated the plaintiff could engage in simple, routine tasks, low stress tasks despite limits in concentration, persistence, and pace; the hypothetical thus implicitly incorporated those limitations. The court also held that the ALJ’s decision was not internally inconsistent simply because he concluded that the same impairments he had found severe at Step two were not ultimately disabling. Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2013) The Court held the failure to conduct a function-by-function analysis at Step four of the Sequential Evaluation is not a per se ground for remand. In affirming the decision of the district court, the Court ruled that despite the requirement of Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, it was joining other circuits in declining to adopt a per se rule that the functions referred to in the SSR must be addressed explicitly. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013) The Court held the ALJ improperly substituted her own lay opinion by rejecting the claimant’s contention that he has fibromyalgia despite a diagnosis by his treating physician. It found the ALJ misconstrued the treating physician’s treatment notes. It criticized the ALJ for relying too heavily on the findings of a consultative examiner based on a single examination. It also found the ALJ improperly substituted her own criteria for fibromyalgia. Citing the guidance from the American College of Rheumatology now made part of SSR 12-2p, the Court remanded for further proceedings, noting the required finding of tender points was not documented in the records. The Court also held the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence. It found the opinion of the consultative examiner upon which the ALJ relied was “remarkably vague.” Finally, the court agreed the ALJ had erred in relying on the Grids to deny the claim. Although it upheld the ALJ’s determination that neither the claimant’s pain nor depression was significant, it concluded the ALJ had not affirmatively determined whether the claimant’s reaching limitations were negligible. | | | | End Note ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ | |  | AI: Superintelligence or Dead-Metaphor Machine? | | In the past few years, there have been several highly publicized court decisions admonishing lawyers who have relied on artificial intelligence (AI) tools like ChatGPT to draft their court filings. One similar decision issued recently in the United State District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan stands out. In sanctioning the plaintiffs for using ChatGPT to draft their briefs, the court in Jarrus v. Governor of Michigan gave a very effective explanation of how large language models (LLMs) work and why generative AI cannot replicate human analysis and reasoning. A major misconception about AI systems is the tendency to mistake language proficiency for "superintelligence." The current AI boom centers on LLMs such as ChatGPT and Gemini that can generate impressively fluent text by predicting word patterns from massive datasets, essentially operating as a “word guesser.” | | | Despite this, they are not capable of human reasoning or understanding, particularly when it comes to the law. Essentially, they can’t actually think like a lawyer despite being an impressive talker. The court in Jarrus cited neuroscience research that focused on how language and thought are separate processes. The Jarrus decision was also notable in that it sanctioned two pro se plaintiffs. Despite the plaintiffs having in forma pauperis status and eligibility for waiver of court fees, the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions against them, a relatively strict measure that serves to warn pro se parties who may be tempted to rely on AI that they are not use it when preparing their court filings. Some consider it a "dead metaphor machine". | | | | | | Contact Us! Advocates can contact the DAP Support attorneys at: Emilia Sicilia: (914) 639-4232, esicilia@empirejustice.org Katherine Courtney: (585) 295-5824, kcourtney@empirejustice.org Ann Biddle: (646) 602-5671, abiddle@urbanjustice.org | | | | | | | | Disability Law News© Disability Law News© is published four times per year by: Empire Justice Center 1 West Main Street, Suite 200 Rochester, NY 14614 Phone: (585) 454-4060 The newsletter is written and edited by: Emilia Sicilia, Esq. Katherine Courtney, Esq. Ann Biddle, Esq. January 2026 issue. Copyright© 2026, Empire Justice Center All rights reserved. Articles may be reprinted only with permission of the authors. Available online at: www.empirejustice.org | | | | | | | | | |